Well, if the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) decided to put their entire fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, the USN would have an interesting afternoon, I suppose.
The problem the IRIN has is that they are completely outclassed by the USN. The USN could mount a strike from a single Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that would completely obliterate the IRIN. It would not be close. Think “clubbing baby seals” and you would get the idea.
This isn’t theoretical, by the way. It’s happened before:
Operation Praying Mantis
1988 U.S. naval offensive against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War Operation Praying Mantis was the 18 April 1988 attack by the United States on Iranian naval targets in the Persian Gulf in retaliation for the mining of a U.S. warship four days earlier. [ 5 ] On 14 April, the American guided missile frigate USS Samuel B.
Roberts struck a mine while transiting international waters as part of Operation Earnest Will , the 1987–88 effort to protect reflagged [ further explanation needed ] Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian attacks during the Iran–Iraq War . The explosion pierced the hull and broke the keel of the Samuel B. Roberts , which nearly sank but was saved by its crew with no loss of life. After the serial numbers of mines recovered in the area were found to match those of mines seized on an Iranian barge the previous September, U.S. military officials planned a retaliatory operation.
On 18 April, the attack destroyed, damaged, or sank two Iranian oil platforms , three warships, several armed boats, and two fighter jets. Two U.S. Marine aviators died when their helicopter crashed into the Gulf. The attack pressured Iran to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq later that summer, ending the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. [ 6 ] Later, Iran sued the United States, claiming that the attacks had breached the countries’ 1955 Treaty of Amity.
On 6 November 2003, the International Court of Justice dismissed the claim but ruled that Operation Praying Mantis and the previous October’s Operation Nimble Archer “cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America.” [ 7 ] Praying Mantis was the largest of the U.S. Navy ‘s five major surface engagements since World War II . [ a ] It saw the U.S. Navy ‘s first exchange of anti-ship missiles with opposing ships, and its only sinking of a major surface combatant since World War II.
On 18 April, the U.S. Navy attacked with several groups of surface warships, plus aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise , and her cruiser escort, USS Truxtun . The action began with coordinated strikes by two surface groups.
One surface action group, or SAG, consisting of the destroyers USS Merrill (including embarked LAMPS Mk I helicopter detachment HSL-35 Det 1 Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 35 ) and USS Lynde McCormick , plus the amphibious transport dock USS Trenton and its embarked Marine air-ground task force (Contingency MAGTF 2-88 from Camp LeJeune, North Carolina) [ 8 ] and the LAMPS helicopter detachment (HSL-44 Det 5) from USS Samuel B. Roberts , was ordered to destroy the guns and other military facilities on the Sassan oil platform.
At 8 am, the SAG commander, who was also the commander of Destroyer Squadron 9, ordered the Merrill to radio a warning to the occupants of the platform, telling them to abandon it. The SAG waited 20 minutes, then opened fire. The oil platform fired back with twin-barrelled 23 mm ZU-23 guns. The SAG’s guns eventually disa
The short version is that the USN got pissed off at Iran after they mined the strait. After a USN Frigate was struck by a mine, the USN decided to go on the offensive. They pretty much kicked Iran’s butt and when Iran decided to attack a supply ship and an oil tanker with speed boats, they dispatched aircraft to sink them. The fighting unfortunately led to the USS Vincennes infamously shooting down an Iranian commercial aircraft.
At any rate, the IRIN already knows that it can’t stand up to the USN and would most likely not attempt such a silly maneuver. Much more likely that they would attack merchant shipping in the strait and generally make things difficult for other oil exporting countries in the gulf.
The Strait of Hormuz is very narrow. You don’t want to be sinking a bunch of ships there. Most of the strait is not very deep, even less so as you come into the Gulf. A fleet of sunken ships would create a hazard to shipping, and make it impossible for submarines to transit submerged.
The shipping channel is deep, but it’s only a few miles wide, and as you exit the channel into the Gulf it shallows quickly. Now when I say shallow, it’s far more than deep enough for shipping purposes; generally 150′ plus. But the masts of ships resting on the bottom can be over 100′ height, keel to mast. Start piling up ships, you could have a problem.
But in all likelihood they would mine the strait, not block it with ships. They know they aren’t going to last long, fighting blow-for-blow.
